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Fashioning an effective international response
to global warming has been a rocky road so
far, and will continue to be in the future. In
1997, international negotiations produced the
Kyoto agreement, aimed at getting countries
to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases.
Given the vicissitudes of global and domestic politics, the implementation of Kyoto has
been halting and contentious. Among many
economists the Kyoto Protocol is something
of an ugly swan. On the one hand, it has a
number of design drawbacks, does not include
countries of the developing world, and pays little attention to implementation. On the other
hand, it does represent some action, and it contains “flexibility mechanisms,” like CO2 trading, that are near and dear to our hearts.
This short book is one of a number of
efforts by economists to critique the agreement and offer improvements. Chapters 2–4
are excellent short summaries covering, respectively, “Science and Uncertainty,” “The
History of International Negotiations,” and
“Why the Kyoto Protocol is the Wrong Approach.” They would be excellent for students
who are being introduced to global warming
and the vicissitudes of getting an effective international response. The subsequent analytical parts, in which the authors present and discuss their “hybrid” modification to the Kyoto
agreement, will frustrate economists because
this discussion treats the ramifications of the
plan very lightly. However, having said this,
it should be noted that this book is a policy
brief meant to inform negotiators and policy

makers about some basic ideas without getting
bogged down in lots of details. The authors direct the reader toward their other published
works where these details are discussed.
Their summary of the major failings of
Kyoto is succinct. “It fails to address the deep
uncertainties in climate change; it is designed
around international permit trading, a politically unrealistic mechanism given the transfers
of wealth that it could cause; it has no viable
mechanism for enforcement; and it contains no
realistic process for increasing participation by
developing countries” (p. 59).
The authors are in the same quandary that
many economists find themselves in: The best
estimates so far appear to indicate that the
costs of any substantial effort to reduce greenhouse gases in the developed economies are
likely to be in excess of the long-run benefits of
greenhouse gas reduction. How can we believe
this, but still respond to our natural desires to
do something about it now. Their formula is
to opt for a “prudent” approach in which we
abate emissions where it is possible to do so
at “modest cost” (p. 61), or “when and where
it is cost effective to do so” (p. 39). We can
all believe in cost effectiveness, but what does
“modest cost” mean?
The primary changes the authors would
make to Kyoto are two: (a) do away with international trading in emission permits, substituting a set of individual country cap and
trade programs in which a cap on “long-term”
or “perpetual” emission permits is set at an internationally negotiated level such as, for example, the countries 1990 emissions; (b) add a
provision whereby governments would be empowered to sell short-run (one-year) permits to
polluters within their countries at a common,
internationally agreed upon price (the “trigger
price”). Individual firms would be in compliance as long as they held any combination of
perpetual and temporary permits that totaled
at least as much as their emissions. Countries
would collect revenues equal to the number of
temporary permits bought by firms in a year,
times the trigger prices.
The authors are adamant in stressing the
impracticality of an international trading program. It would require harmonizing legal
systems more than is realistically possible;
it would lead to excessive wealth transfers
among countries; it would upset international
monetary flows, and it would not result in cost
savings as substantial as its advocates claim.
One might argue whether a system of individual sales markets for temporary permits

at an agreed upon international price is any
more practical. In addition, as more and more
trading programs are coming off the drawing boards, especially international trading
schemes in, for example, Europe, this negative
judgment may have been overtaken by events.
The trigger price scheme for selling shortrun (one-year) permits amounts essentially to
a greenhouse gas tax that would be applied to
all emissions over the base, or permanent level.
On the assumption that all countries establish internal trading plans, and the assumption
that actual emissions exceed base or permanent levels, marginal abatement costs would be
equalized at the trigger price among all sources
in all countries.
The primary advantage claimed for this hybrid scheme is that it would allow countries to
avoid uncertain abatement costs that turn out
to be very high. Another advantage claimed
for their proposal is that it would reduce the
disincentives countries, especially developing
countries, have for joining an international
agreement. This is so because the trigger price
scheme for temporary permits would limit the
overall cost of joining, thus countries would
not run the risk of curtailing growth. They also
claim greater ease of enforcement, because a
domestic constituency would develop in participating countries to enforce the program in
order to protect the value of the perpetual permits, and also to be able to raise money from
selling temporary permits.
The book is an excellent policy brief of their
plan, good for policy makers and good also
for economists (especially graduate students)
who would like to consider the plan and try to
work out some of its implications and ramifications. Perhaps the one added element that
might have added to the book’s value is some
scenario analysis that would show how the hybrid approach they suggest would be better
than any alternative.
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